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The German government presented the decision to phase out nuclear energy as a 
nationally accepted rebalancing of inequality in the energy sector. We expose how this 
radical change was delivered through a myriad of change agents, most notably through 
the rise of small energy companies. Critical junctures, in this case the Chernobyl disaster 
rather than Fukushima, offer moments in time when national policy systems are 
destabilized. They provide opportunities for changing policy in a perceived pro-energy 
justice direction if a new consensus can be forged. The paper concludes with a discussion 
on how energy scholars must engage more with policy analysis frameworks if long-term 
effective solutions are to be found to persistent energy inequalities.  
Keywords: Energy justice; historical institutionalism; policy analysis; policy change; 
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1. Introduction 
The decarbonisation of the energy sector must be accompanied by long-term 
societal buy-in [1, 2]. At the heart of this endeavour lies the requirement to 
implant equity and justice (termed as ‘energy justice’) into the fabric of energy 
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systems [3]. We often think of the processes that need to happen for energy justice 
to occur – reframing policy values [3-5], integrating energy systems [6, 7], 
reducing consumption [8-10], increasing energy ‘capabilities’ [11-13], ensuring 
human security [14], mitigating climate change [2, 15], re-interpreting activism 
[16] and projecting ethics [1, 17]. Existing research is heavily driven by spatial or 
place centred explanations of change. We have not properly considered in the 
energy justice literature when and how policy change takes place. This paper 
responds to this gap through exploring how notions of critical junctures [18] and 
change agents [19] help us understand when and how energy justice can be 
achieved in the context of policy change. 
We focus on both in the development of nuclear energy policy in Germany. 
Rehner and McCauley [20] revealed in their study of German nuclear policy that a 
wide range of government, business and civil society actors consider the phase 
out of nuclear energy to be a perceived just outcome. Sovacool, Andersen [21] go 
further by arguing that society should reject nuclear power to achieve energy 
justice. Achieving energy justice is therefore based upon value judgements on 
which energy technologies should be supported, and which should be rejected 
[22]. In terms of German policy on nuclear energy, the final value judgement by 
policy actors was to consider that nuclear energy should be rejected to further 
energy justice [23].  
Within this context, our paper investigates how this final judgement came 
about. It is often wrongly assumed [20, 24-28] that the Fukushima disaster led to 
a seismic alteration in nuclear policy in Germany, driven by an opportunistic 
German government. Studies on public opinion suggest a major shift in the 
German psyche after Fukushima [29-34]. We focus on the less studied role of 
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policy actors in German nuclear policy and reveal below that the process began 
much earlier after the Chernobyl disaster – what we term as the ‘critical juncture’. 
This disaster initiated an opportunity window for policy change on nuclear. Our 
analysis reveals that emerging small businesses, rather than simply government 
actors, were critical during this time for succeeding to re-orient German nuclear 
policy towards phase-out. We conclude the paper with reflections on key 
conclusions and implications for both interdisciplinary research in energy. 
 
2. Energy justice, critical junctures and change agents  
We position our study within an emerging literature set on energy justice as well 
as the more established scholarship in historical policy analysis. The application 
of the latter to energy justice offers a new definitional and analytical framework, 
which emphasizes temporal reflection in relation to critical junctures, change 
agents and, more broadly, shifting policy trajectories. This framework emphasizes 
the need for engineers and economists in the energy sector to be cognizant of how 
policy structures and processes change over time. 
 
2.1 Energy justice in the context of policy change 
The combination of historical policy analysis and energy justice requires a new 
complementary definitional and analytical framework to existing approaches.  
The first existing group of definitions are normative statements based upon 
creating fairer energy systems [6-8, 35, 36]. Such definitions miss the complexity 
of the shifting nature of values and norms over time. A second set of definitions on 
energy justice is philosophical, underlining cosmopolitan approaches in 
prioritizing energy delivery for all individuals [11, 37-40]. They fail to adequately 
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consider the processes through which policy actors seek to deliver their version 
of energy justice. The third definitional category of energy justice literature is 
analytical, in so far as energy justice is defined as an analytical framework, 
whether it be three [4, 41, 42] or four [43] dimensions involving numerous 
measurements [17, 37]. These studies have failed to adequately recognize 
longitudinal complexities in policy change, opting for a more cross-sectional 
understanding of energy justice. 
Energy justice in the context of policy change requires a new definition, as 
well as a new (in so far as it has not yet been applied to energy justice) analytical 
framework (see section 2.2) which is sensitive to understanding change over time. 
From this temporal perspective, we define energy justice in the context of policy 
change as the adoption and subsequent reformation of an agreed plan of action or 
policy framework designed by multiple actors with the stated purpose of 
enhancing principles of fairness and equity in or between energy systems. Our 
approach is focused upon uncovering the processes through which policy actors 
agree, review, and deliver what they understand to be energy justice in terms of 
national policies. It is based upon assumptions in historical institutionalism found 
in political science of embracing the fluidity of time [44-46] and the agency of 
political actors [47, 48]. 
 We contribute historical policy analysis as a means for assessing energy 
justice in the context of policy change [19, 44, 49-51]. Its analytical focus is 
centered on identifying major shocks to a policy system – known as critical 
junctures [18] – and then assessing how effective policy actors are in exploiting 
these opportunities – known as ‘agents of change’ or ‘change agents’ [19]. We 
argue below that the rise of small businesses as key change agents in the wake of 
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Chernobyl disaster has driven policy change on nuclear energy in Germany. In this 
way, we respond to Jenkins, McCauley [52: 2] “call for greater attention to 
different temporal questions of justice…considering when and how transitions 
take place and resultantly, when energy justice can be achieved”. 
 
2.2 Critical Junctures and change agents 
Critical junctures and change agents are dominant ideas in historical policy 
analysis, or historical institutionalism [19, 44, 49-51]. It is “historical because it 
recognises that political development must be understood as process that unfolds 
over time” [53: 29]. It is institutionalist because “it stresses that many of the 
contemporary implications of these temporal processes are embedded in 
institutions, whether these be formal rules, policy structures, or social norms” [54: 
29].  Pierson [54] refers to historical institutionalism as essentially the study of 
“politics in time”. Energy justice, and its multiple understandings, similarly unfolds 
over time. We offer the first contribution to time based reflections applied to 
energy justice literature through the application of historical institutionalism for 
understanding critical junctures, change agents and more broadly policy change.  
Critical junctures are events that set processes of policy change in motion. 
Our examination focuses on nuclear disasters – Chernobyl in particular – as 
potential critical junctures in national policies. A crisis takes place leading to 
ideational and radical policy change [55]. The study of critical junctures involves, 
therefore, an examination of historical causation. A given moment in time, such as 
Chernobyl, can have major long-term transformative impacts on society. The 
critical nature of a juncture is therefore in the outcomes produced in one historical 
moment, which persists over time. This juncture does not, however, create in itself 
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a shift from previous established trajectories. It more precisely marks the 
loosening of constraints in societal structures to which various agents respond in 
an attempt to retain or move away from the status quo [56].  
In addition to critical junctures, agents’ choices are critical variables in 
defining outcomes. Critical junctures are indeed rare moments in time [18]. This 
has led to a number of researchers [19, 47, 57-59] investigating the role of ‘change 
agents’. Capoccia and Keleman [56] comment further, “we define critical junctures 
as…periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability 
that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest”. In other words, agents are 
more able to influence outcomes during critical junctures, than the preceding or 
proceeding timeframes.    
Choice is explored in the opportunity space of a critical juncture. Similar to 
Kingdon’s [60] policy streams and Kriesi’s [61] political opportunity models, 
entrepreneurs, social movements or more broadly societal agents attempt to gain 
influence during windows of opportunity. We draw more explicitly from Mahoney 
and Thelen [19] on policy change and change agents. We contribute to this 
approach by specifying that such agents can seek to achieve continuity (i.e. 
resisting any change in policy), as well as change (i.e. seeking to modify or displace 
existing policy). The notion of agency (discussed further in section 6.2 below) 
involves the identification of such agents (both change and continuity) in a given 
critical juncture process. From this perspective, we re-conceptualize the ‘change 
agents’ within the framework of ‘agents of change’ and ‘agents of continuity’.  
 
3. Methodology  
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A key factor in country selection is the evidently contrasting experiences of 
Germany on nuclear policy with its European counterparts. France, as the leading 
European nuclear nation, has not replicated the much-publicized roll back of the 
German nuclear industry. The German government decided to phase out all of its 
nuclear electricity capacity by 2022. It declared on 15th March 2011 that 8 (from 
17 in total) of its oldest nuclear reactors would be immediately placed out of 
operation. This resolution symbolized the flagship project of the so-called 
Energiewende (energy U-turn), also designed to increase the share of renewables 
whilst reducing oil and gas imports [62, 63]. Nuclear still provides a substantial 
16% of German electricity. France is an eye-catching juxtaposition with over 75% 
of electricity originating from the second (behind the US) largest nuclear industry 
in the world with 58 reactors generating more than 60 GWe [64, 65]. 
Our overall research question is therefore why Germany started the process of 
phasing out nuclear energy whereas other European nations chose not to. Our 
primary research question is – why did the agents of change succeed in moving 
German nuclear policy when the agents of continuity did not? To answer this, we 
need to identify (1) who these agents are and (2) what strategies did they enact. 
We identify the Chernobyl accident, rather than Fukushima, as the critical juncture 
moment for German nuclear policy. The Fukushima disaster only served to 
maintain this critical juncture. This ultimately led to Germany and other EU 
nations’ nuclear policies dividing in terms of whether to retain the technology in 
the national energy mix. We explore each event in more detail in the next section.  
In terms of research data collection and analysis, we have no specific 
quantitative or engineering application that one might expect in Applied Energy. 
Instead, we address the key knowledge gaps (as also identified in the broader 
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special issue) in energy ethics literature when applied to energy systems through 
qualitative analysis, namely (a) the procedural principles for encouraging a 
sustainable and inclusive energy transition (b) policy interactions between 
different levels of governance (e.g. national-regional-municipal) and their 
implications for procedural justice (c) social struggles and strategies to engage 
energy justice issues across different levels of governance. 
We followed the qualitative approach dominant in historical policy analysis 
[51, 54]. This contrasts starkly with the quantitative methods normally employed 
by engineers [66-68] and economists [69] when confronting the phase out of 
nuclear energy in Germany. Similar to Zehavi [70] and Spohr [71], we use a 
combination of oral history interviews (22 in total in between 2014 and 2017) and 
historical documents such as reports, newspapers and other relevant material. 
This approach is in line with the same approach in existing research on historical 
policy change [49, 70, 72, 73] where 15-20 in-depth oral history interviews are 
conducted and complemented with documentation. 
 We conducted 22 interviews with ex-employees or long-term employees of 
businesses (KPMG, E.ON, RWE), NGOs (Attac, Burgern-Begehren Klimaschutz, 
Powershift) and state representatives (Federal Office for Radiation Protection, 
Ministry of Environment and European Nuclear Safety Regulation Group). We 
followed a snowball sampling strategy where interview candidates were referred 
to us by interviewees in line with other similar research [74, 75]. Oral history 
interviews are best undertaken with representatives with substantial experience 
[76, 77]. We asked interviewees (in English) to reflect on key events in the past in 
relation to German nuclear policy and its development. The interviews were then 
transcribed in English and coded for analysis based on key events in policy 
 9 
development as outlined in the next paragraph. The interview structure was 
therefore designed in a way to elaborate on their understandings of these past 
events. Some interviewees requested anonymity, and as a result we have 
anonymised the interview data. This was necessary to benefit from the input of 
experienced officials, in lie with Zehavi [55] and Spohr [56]. 
We numbered all 22 interviews, randomized their order, and then present 
them in text as (1) or (4) etc.. The focus was on critically evaluating their 
discourse. We coded the data based on events, rather than themes. The interviews 
are used in a way to validate historical events (such as when key policy or strategy 
decisions were made for example the first turnaround in policy in 2010, or when 
changes in policy attitudes emerged directly after Chernobyl) and provide 
analysis on them. This is in line with the approach undertaken by Zehavi [55]. We 
complement this data with existing literature, reports and selected newspapers. 
The focus is on developing a triangulated robust account of events in nuclear 
policy development through comparing our interview data with policy 
documentation and historical records. We also note the key limitations of our 
study in not engaging with quantitative methods, through for example content 
analysis, or being able to develop a comprehensive quantitative analysis of causal 
relationships between key variables. This was a necessary focus for our paper. 
 
4. Assessing the role of change agents  
Chernobyl opened a lengthy phase of uncertainty with regards to nuclear policy. 
In historical policy analysis, there are normally three categories of actors [19, 47, 
48]. This is in addition to public opinion which dominates engineering and 
particularly economic based research on nuclear and social acceptability [24, 29, 
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34, 78, 79]. The first is the state, as a multi actor agent with institutions at a local, 
regional and national level. The second is business involving large and small 
companies, with sectoral and multinational interests. Civil society is the third set 
of agents that are often associated with local and national protest or lobbying. We 
assess each of these actors below. 
 
4.1 The State  
In the German case, relationships between state agents as well as their 
contributions to policy processes have been dominated by a constitutionally 
enshrined dispersal and fragmentation of power. Katzenstein [80] describes 
Germany as a ‘semi-sovereign state’. It is a political system that displays an 
unusually large number of veto players in decision-making. The need to reach 
consensus means that policy change or reform has tended to be modest and 
incremental rather than abrupt and radical. Policy change on nuclear energy is 
negotiated in Germany between various state agents, the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat, often following an incremental and path-dependent (i.e. where policy 
is difficult to change due to the lock-in of past policy decisions) course of action. 
Prior to the German nuclear energy phase-out, state agents had been 
moving between continuity (i.e. nuclear energy status quo) and change (i.e. 
nuclear energy phase-out) for some time (11), making a consistent government 
position “almost impossible to discern, even along party lines” (3). This process 
started with a pro-nuclear stance in the post-war period, which was crucial to 
Germany’s economic recovery. Cracks in the government’s nuclear policy 
appeared from the 1970s onwards eventually contributing towards a first phase-
out position in 2001, temporarily reversed by another Federal Government in 
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2010, before the second instigated– and (arguably) final - phase-out was 
introduced in 2013. State agents were influenced by – and at times confronted 
with – “consensus scenarios” involving different sets of (veto) agents representing 
different government levels (local, Länder, Federal), stakeholder interests (civil 
society versus business) and party-political agendas (4).   
A vital contributing factor in the shaping (and shifting) of Germany’s 
nuclear policy has been the electoral system. It produced several coalition 
governments at Länder and Federal levels. These coalitions included small parties, 
which proved influential in the nuclear policy discourse. At the Federal level, the 
Greens pushed for policy change i.e. a first phase-out in 2001 under the Schröder-
Fischer Government (1998-2005), while the Free Democratic Party (FDP) 
contributed towards a temporary reversal in 2010 in the direction of policy 
continuity under the Merkel-Westerwelle (2009-2013) government. The final 
phase-out was “almost certainly down to the departure of the FDP”, the small 
collation pro-nuclear partner (3). The subsequent Grand Coalition of the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) / Christian 
Social Union (CSU) 2013+ is now pursuing a generally anti-nuclear approach.  
However, to argue that the policy shift can be attributed solely to political 
parties and their coalition constellations would be “a serious mistake in analysis 
if taken in isolation, despite the common consensus on this” (4). Individual 
politicians’ nuclear policy journeys from continuity to change are significant also, 
with the most notable one being Angela Merkel’s shift towards the phase-out 
shortly after Fukushima (4). Described by Huß [81: 434] as Merkel’s ‘new 
favourite policy project’, change was implemented despite warnings from civil 
servants and other continuity agents regarding the potential legal and corporate 
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compensation costs of such a move.1 Interestingly, the political calculation over 
negative voting behaviour resulting from a pro-nuclear stance seemed to 
outweigh the potential financial costs that would occur later with a phasing-out, 
“an act of self-harming myopic political suicide for a country, but perhaps not for 
a party seeking votes, or for an ambitious individual” (5).  
Indeed, Merkel opted for an anti-nuclear policy because - a) she did not 
want to lose vital votes from core CDU voters (11), b) she ‘stole environmental 
votes’ from her opponents - the SPD and the Greens (5), and c) she thereby made 
a future coalition with the Greens possible (11). In addition to this political 
reality, Merkel mobilized significant anti-nuclear sentiment through the 
establishment of an Ethics Commission. The 17 member commission, headed by 
Klaus Toepfer former head of the United Nations Environmental Programme, 
recommended a national programme of nuclear phase-out [82]. One interviewee 
(4) stated the committee was “only symbolic of a decision that was made years 
ago…we just didn’t realise it”. Emphasis from several respondents (4, 5, 6, 11) 
was placed rather on agreeing the Renewable Act in 2006 programme as a key 
moment that effectively challenged the big 4 energy companies, as assessed 
below.  
 
4.2 Business  
Energy companies in Germany are far from unitary or autonomous. They consist 
of small and large companies with vested interests in a large, profitable energy 
sector. They are also influenced by both German and EU law as well as wider 
                                                        
1 See Spiegel 10/2015 ‘Ablage Papierkorb’, pp.34-36. 
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energy market forces. A key distinction can be made between those companies 
that embraced the Energiewende (i.e. the German policy of sustainable energy 
transition, incorporating a wide range of actions including the nuclear phase-out 
and the expansion of renewables – first explicitly mentioned in 1980 by the 
Environment Ministry and then legislatively in 2010) and those that have sought 
to resist such a policy change (1, 6). Interestingly, the phasing out of fossil fuels 
did not feature as prominently as part of the Energiewende policy. 
The four large, somewhat oligopolistic, German energy companies (E.On, 
RWE, Vattenfall and EnBw, also known as the Big 4) have invested heavily in 
nuclear technology (having built the post-war nuclear fleet and allocated large 
resources to maintain the fleet in future). Early attempts by smaller companies to 
implement a decentralisation of energy capacity in the 1990s were resisted by the 
Big 4. In other words, “it was evident to all that the Big 4 lobbied in favour of a 
centralised energy sector” with an emphasis on economies of scale in traditional/ 
conventional technologies (7). Their opposition to smaller scale renewables was, 
however, significantly hindered, or “killed dead” (8) with the implementation of 
the Renewable Energy Act in 2006. This had been introduced by the SPD-Green 
Federal government coalition before their departure later that year. The 
government, in doing so, created a spring board for renewables. In the same year, 
the original law to phase-out nuclear was introduced in tandem, compensated by 
an expansion of renewables to ensure future electricity capacity. Mostly private 
“investors, project developers and even farmers” were then able to invest in 
smaller scale renewables (2).  
While the incumbent energy companies failed to invest in decentralised 
renewable capacity, they “hedged their bets on future reinvestment in centralized 
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electricity systems” (2), expecting that the decentralised renewable energy 
sources would remain marginalized [83]. Lobbying of pro-nuclear institutions 
continued in order to convince policy makers about the security and suitability of 
installed fossil and nuclear electricity capacity (7). 
Furthermore, the industry had deep concerns over the most recent (and 
possibly final) nuclear phase-out move. It referred to this decision at the time as 
“potentially catastrophic” (2, 7). There are, however, indications that some 
actors involved in the industry had already accepted the end of the industry with 
the last phase-out, considering any further investment in nuclear energy as a 
‘gamble’ if not ‘bad business’ [84]. Without a pro-nuclear political party in 
government and the final phase-out decision after the Fukushima incident backed 
by almost all political parties, renewables were no longer considered as 
marginalized energy sources. They emerged as increasingly dominant 
technologies within the future energy mix [83].  
The fact that business agents – and specifically the Big 4 - failed to maintain 
the status quo/ continuity by influencing both state and civil society agents and 
cushioning the impact of Fukushima, suggests that agents of continuity lost out in 
the policy discourse - in relation to nuclear energy only – perhaps not in relation 
to fossil fuels [85] (an area for further research). Chernobyl had initiated an 
opportunity space for anti-nuclear sentiments to gain momentum in the business 
sector. What split the business agents further was also the connection made 
between renewables and the nuclear phase out; both policies were introduced and 
conducted together simultaneously. 
 
4.3 Civil society  
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The anti-nuclear stance that dominates mainstream German politics today has 
origins in social movements (8). This arguably radical stance evolved into a 
mainstream policy stance supported by mainstream civil society and their 
political representatives. The shift from a narrow radical policy demand for 
change on the margins of politics to mainstream commitment in German society 
and politics is significant. To understand how Germany’s civil society agents have 
sought to influence nuclear policy, it is necessary to look at contributing factors 
and strategies undertaken within the opportunity space (i.e since Chernobyl). 
Firstly, while the federal system is often associated with slow 
incrementalism, in the case of nuclear phase-out, “federalism has played a 
facilitating role” in the political discourse (8). The Federal level could not ignore 
the debate as nuclear energy is shared between government levels, involving also 
the Bundestag and Bundesrat in law-making. In effect, the federal structure, 
usually hampered by veto points, did not represent a deterrent to the anti-nuclear 
message. In fact, it helped to organise and channel the message of policy change 
across all vertical (and, indeed, horizontal) levels of governance. When civil 
society groups in Länder (for instance, Hesse and Lower Saxony) showed their 
opposition towards nuclear energy, this then had a knock-on effect on other 
Länder. This “was also the case for the Federal level” as the matter of nuclear 
energy is shared by all requiring some degree of consensus of all levels (8). 
 The German electoral system helped, secondly, to transmit the anti-
nuclear message from civil society to parliament and government (10). It offered 
the anti-nuclear movement a means to voice its concerns in parliament and 
government (at all levels) via the Green Party and large parts of the SPD while also 
sensitising the other parties to ‘environmentally sensitive voters’ [81]. Indeed, 
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losing green votes to opponents was something that Merkel sought to avoid in 
view of Länder elections that were due to take place, as discussed in section 5.1 
above. This concern was justified as demonstrated shortly after Fukushima when 
the CDU did lose its stronghold in Baden-Wuerttemberg and the Greens took office 
in Stuttgart.  
The relationship between the civil and military use of nuclear power was, 
thirdly, a means to “propagating anti-nuclear policy stances” (9). In contrast to 
France [86], where a perceptive link between civil and military use of nuclear is 
not only established but also fostered as part of the country’s national identity and 
security, in Germany, nuclear power, be it civil or military, generates negative 
connotations. In military terms, post-war Germany never intended to pursue a 
nuclear programme but focused instead on the civil use of nuclear energy. To 
abandon nuclear power therefore does not affect Germany’s security or sense of 
security, nor does it affect Germany’s national identity. On the contrary, any risk 
to German civil society is identified in the safety of (or lack of) nuclear power 
plants rather than Germany’s ability to defend itself in military terms.  
 
4.4 From agents of continuity to change  
Change agents can often shift their allegiances from continuity to change or vice 
versa throughout the lifetime of a policy. This is a more sophisticated view on the 
role of agency within policy systems, rather than understanding actors as simply 
locked into pre-set logics of preference. Before Chernobyl, local and regional 
actors were lobbying for a more anti-nuclear policy. These included regional 
governments, green political representatives and civil society. Small and large 
businesses, national government, mainstream party representatives maintained a 
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cautiously pro nuclear stance. Chernobyl injected a significant level of disruption 
into these policy constellations, representing a critical juncture. Local protests 
against nuclear energy took place across the country through the sustained 
management of civil society organisations. The 1990s witnessed (1) the rise of 
Green Party as well as (2) new energy related businesses through efforts to 
decentralize energy supply. These two phenomena are identified as the critical 
shifts in agency. 
The Green Party strategically manoeuvred in this opportunity space to 
exploit the dual purpose of phasing out nuclear energy and promoting renewable 
energy in its place [87]. It entered into government in 1998 in coalition with the 
Social Democrats. It also coincided with the rise of Angela Merkel who took over 
as leader of the Christian Democrats, positioning herself as a more progressive 
and green minded politician. Between 1998 and 2005, the red green government 
established the basis of the renewable act signed in 2006. This proved more 
crucial than either the 2001 phase out or 2010 phase in legislation. During this 
period, smaller energy companies acted decisively in lobbying this favourable 
government, thereby encouraging the growth of new anti-nuclear business in 
Germany. We argue that strategic manoeuvring from these actors resulted in a 
collective ability to respond to the Fukushima disaster in 2011, leading to the 
official adoption of a nuclear phase out policy.  
 
5. Conclusion and policy implications: Achieving energy justice 
Reflecting on our central empirical research question, why did the agents of change 
succeed in moving German nuclear policy when the agents of continuity did not? In 
terms of context, our answer is not the Fukushima disaster. We point to the critical 
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role played by the Chernobyl disaster instead (as detailed in section 4). It opened 
up the space for government and new emerging businesses to agree upon the 
Renewable Act in 2006. This set in motion a significant change in German nuclear 
policy. The momentum for change was instigated by favourable party 
constellations and individuals in government, emerging renewable energy 
companies and civil society. We reflect on the broader implications of this 
research for both policy and energy research below. 
 
5.1 ‘Critical’ junctures in policy are more than simply events  
Events offer opportunities, not change. We should not expect that certain events 
lead to significant shifts in policy trajectories. It is up to societal actors to establish 
the groundwork, strategize and then mobilize at the right time. Analysts in nuclear 
energy policy are concerned with major events such as accidents or instances of 
contamination [24, 88, 89]. This is of course understandable given the nature of 
the technology in focus. Our paper underlines the importance of including such 
events in our analyses but placing such occurrences within the limitations of 
agency. This observation has significant implications for nuclear policy. The 
construction of a policy is a robust and long-term endeavour involving a wide 
range of policy actors [57].  
We must not expect that an event in the future will lead us to realise or 
achieve energy justice, but it can initiate a period of crisis and uncertainty – or 
policy opportunity window – for change agents to exploit. Real change takes place 
over a long period. In following Mahoney and Thelen [19], it involves the slow 
development of new ideas to take hold within path dependent policy structures. 
Civil society, political parties, businesses all provide various levels of input into a 
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combined vision of what a given political entity’s (nation, region, community etc.) 
understanding is of an energy ‘just’ future. This vision will inevitably emerge from 
competing priorities.  
Chernobyl led to an opportunity for a common German understanding of 
energy justice to develop based upon the Energiewende policy frame of phasing 
out nuclear and increasing the deployment of renewable energy. Our study 
highlights how this national frame of energy justice became the product of shifting 
views from a wide range of state, civil and business organisations. The fluid 
dynamics of coalition politics, the energy business sector and anti-nuclear civil 
society resulted in competing views on nuclear and renewables, often in 
confrontation with long-term path dependent policy trajectories. We demonstrate 
the critical nature of events in allowing policy actors to forge national frames of 
energy justice. Once constructed, critical events can initiate periods of time during 
which there is a substantially heightened possibility that agents can affect policy 
[90], as we outlined in the period between Chernobyl and Fukushima.  
 
5.2 Agents of change and continuity are drivers for energy justice  
Whilst our study focused on the ability of change agents to shift policy, we must 
also consider in future research that agents of continuity can also be important for 
our understanding of policy change. The US example is a good case in point. A post-
Obama era may rely more upon agents of continuity (who helped build a path 
towards the Paris Climate Treaty) than change on energy matters. Our German 
case demonstrates that a comprehensive analysis of change agents must of course 
include an understanding of which actors resist policy change. As new policy 
trajectories take hold, such as the phase out of fossil fuels, so must new agents of 
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continuity strategically manoeuvre to ensure its lock-in. This approach 
acknowledges, above all, the fact that the positions of policy actors can change 
over time – oscillating between taking up positions as agents of change and 
continuity at different moments.  
Policy development – and the understandings of energy justice that are at 
the focal point of this process – is constantly under negotiation. Businesses were 
at one point agreed on the continuation of policy on nuclear in Germany. The rise 
of emerging renewable companies created a shifting dynamic in the preferences 
of business. In terms of government, ruling parties and coalitions change all the 
time. We revealed that new government coalitions combined with these emerging 
companies were able to generate a long-term shift in policy thinking on nuclear. 
State, business and civil society interests formed and then reformed their 
approach towards achieving organisational or sector policy objectives. Energy 
justice involves the same interplay between policy agents and process. Views of 
energy justice are not static or individually manufactured. They are formed, 
reformed and then renegotiated in response to other views over time. 
Energy justice literature has prioritised the influence of civil society 
organisations as the drivers for change [16, 42]. Policy change does benefit from 
community based pressure [91]. The German case demonstrates that some form 
of government pressure is equally beneficial for ensuring a process of policy 
change takes place. For this reason, we must be aware of how policy is constructed 
by multiple actors [92]. In addition to this observation, we show that the positions 
of each can change dramatically within the lifespan of a policy. Those actors that 
previously supported change can often manoeuvre as agents of continuity, and 
vice versa. We therefore call on energy justice researchers to critically reflect on 
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the strategies of elite actors [20, 93], as well as the more traditional community 
bottom-up drivers of change [16, 91, 94].  
 
5.3 Energy Justice Now! Reflections from historical policy analysis  
“We must come out of nuclear energy now...it is the only way that we can have a 
safe and just energy future” (12), stated a German activist. We should not 
conclude that such pressure directly leads to policy change. A policy is a robust or 
‘sticky’ [18] institution, a frequent conceptualisation in political science where an 
“institution is understood as rules constraining the actions of the participating 
actors” [95], that remains highly path dependent. Historical policy analysis 
encourages authors in energy justice to be more cautious about observing 
significant change. Within a European context, it is still debatable whether 
Chernobyl sparked a critical juncture (as argued in this paper) in national nuclear 
policies beyond Germany, not to mention Fukushima. We should therefore 
critically reflect when faced with claims of significant policy change.     
Critical junctures are currently undervalued in energy research as 
significant moments in policy trajectories that open policy opportunity windows. 
We must understand when such events take place, and, above all, how change 
agents successfully exploit them. When we consider the ‘stickiness’ of policy 
structures and processes, we must understand that change takes place over a long 
time. We therefore must adopt more radical low carbon solutions today with a 
view to infiltrating policy structures in the future. Bell and Rowe [96] present 
insights into how this may be achieved. Within this context, we need to appreciate 
that energy systems, and their consequent inequalities, do not respect national 
boundaries. The phase out of nuclear energy in Germany is in contradiction with 
 22 
other European States such as France. The need for European integration (or 
Energy Union) on energy decisions has never been so apposite.  
The identification of ‘change agents’ is as important as ‘critical junctures’. 
Chernobyl or Fukushima do not simply change public opinion which would be 
consider as a key component to social acceptability by economists [34, 78]. Events 
offer opportunities for agents to respond accordingly. Historical policy analysis 
must continue to examine seismic shifts in policy, but also the key agents of society 
that are involved in either hindering or encouraging change. This challenges 
scholars in the emerging field of energy justice and interdisciplinary scholarship 
in energy to engage more critically with the ways in which energy policy develops. 
Historical policy analysis chimes a sobering note to ambitious hopes for radical 
change when we consider the ‘stickiness’ of processes and structures. Inversely, 
we should respond with greater urgency in recognition of this challenge. We 
conclude with a demand for other policy analysis tools to be applied to energy 
justice, such as the more conventional discursive or rational choice 
institutionalism. This will help to build a more comprehensive picture on how 
energy justice can contribute to our understanding of enacting positive change.  
 
Word Count: 8038 (including references) 
 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank all the interviewees for taking so much time out to reflect 
on key events. We also thank the reviewers for their comments on our submission. 
In terms of funders, we thank the ESRC (ES/I001425/1). 
 
 23 
References 
[1] Heffron RJ, McCauley D. What is the ‘Just Transition’? Geoforum. 2018;88:74-
7. 
[2] McCauley D, Heffron R. Just Transition: Integrating climate, energy and 
environmental justice. Energy Policy. 2018;119:1-7. 
[3] McCauley D. Energy Justice: Re-Balancing the Trilemma of Security, Poverty 
and Climate Change. Basingstoke: Palgrave; 2018. 
[4] McCauley D, Heffron R, Stephan H, Jenkins K. Advancing energy justice: the 
triumvirate of tenets. International Energy Law Review. 2013;3:107-11. 
[5] McCauley D, Heffron R, Pavlenko M, Rehner R, Holmes R. Energy justice in the 
Arctic: Implications for energy infrastructural development in the Arctic. Energy 
Research & Social Science. 2016. 
[6] Heffron RJ, McCauley D. Achieving sustainable supply chains through energy 
justice. Applied Energy. 2014;123:435-7. 
[7] Jenkins K, McCauley D, Heffron R, Stephan H, Rehner R. Energy justice: A 
conceptual review. Energy Research & Social Science. 2016;11:174-82. 
[8] Hall SM. Energy justice and ethical consumption: comparison, synthesis and 
lesson drawing. Local Environment. 2013;18:422-37. 
[9] Walker G, Simcock N, Day R. Necessary energy uses and a minimum standard 
of living in the United Kingdom: Energy justice or escalating expectations? Energy 
Research & Social Science. 2016;18:129-38. 
[10] Bouzarovski S, Herrero ST. Geographies of injustice: the socio-spatial 
determinants of energy poverty in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Post 
Communist Economies. 2016;29:27-50. 
 24 
[11] Damgaard C, McCauley D, Long J. Assessing the Energy Justice Implications of 
Bioenergy Development in Nepal. Energy, Sustainability and Society. 2017;7. 
[12] Day R, Walker G, Simcock N. Conceptualising energy use and energy poverty 
using a capabilities framework. Energy Policy. 2016;93:255-64. 
[13] Gillard R, Snell C, Bevan M. Advancing an energy justice perspective of fuel 
poverty: Household vulnerability and domestic retrofit policy in the United 
Kingdom. Energy Research & Social Science. 2017;29:53-61. 
[14] Sovacool BK, Sidortsov R, Jones B. Energy Security, Equality and Justice. 
London: Routledge; 2013. 
[15] Bulkeley H, Carmin J, Castán Broto V, Edwards GAS, Fuller S. Climate justice 
and global cities: Mapping the emerging discourses. Global Environmental 
Change. 2013;23:914-25. 
[16] Fuller S, McCauley D. Framing energy justice: perspectives from activism and 
advocacy. Energy Research & Social Science. 2016;11:1-8. 
[17] Sovacool BK, Heffron RJ, McCauley D, Goldthau A. Energy decisions reframed 
as justice and ethical concerns. Nature Energy. 2016;1:16-24. 
[18] Soifer HD. The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures. Comparative Political 
Studies. 2012;45:1572-97. 
[19] Mahoney J, Thelen K. Explaining institutional change: Ambiguity, agency and 
power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2010. 
[20] Rehner R, McCauley D. Security, justice and the energy crossroads: Assessing 
the implications of the nuclear phase-out in Germany. Energy Policy. 
2016;88:289-98. 
 25 
[21] Sovacool BK, Andersen R, Sorensen S, Sorensen K, Tienda V, Vainorius A, et 
al. Balancing safety with sustainability: assessing the risk of accidents for modern 
low-carbon energy systems. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2016;112:3952-65. 
[22] McCauley D. An Energy Justice Road Map - Six Key Considerations. In: 
McCauley D, editor. Energy Justice: Springer; 2018. p. 75-103. 
[23] McCauley D. Reframing Decommissioning as Energy Infrastructural 
Investment: A comparative analysis of motivational frames in Scotland and 
Germany. Energy Research & Social Science. 2018;forthcoming. 
[24] Arlt D, Wolling J. Fukushima effects in Germany? Changes in media coverage 
and public opinion on nuclear power. Public Understanding of Science. 
2016;25:842-57. 
[25] Chassot S. Sustainable? A cross-country analysis of the socio-political 
acceptance of the nuclear phase out in Germany and Switzerland focusing on 
opportunities for strategic influence. Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung Und 
Praxis. 2014;66:247-65. 
[26] Knopf B, Pahle M, Kondziella H, Joas F, Edenhofer O, Bruckner T. Germany's 
Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on Electricity Prices and CO2 
Emissions. Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy. 2014;3:89-105. 
[27] Matthes F. Exit economics: The relatively low cost of Germany's nuclear 
phase-out. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2012;68:42-54. 
[28] Winter G. The Rise and Fall of Nuclear Energy Use in Germany: Processes, 
Explanations and the Role of Law. Journal of Environmental Law. 2013;25:95-124. 
[29] Engels A, Hüther O, Schäfer M, Held H. Public climate-change skepticism, 
energy preferences and political participation. Global Environmental Change Part 
A: Human & Policy Dimensions. 2013;23:1018-27. 
 26 
[30] Kepplinger HM, Lemke R. Instrumentalizing Fukushima: Comparing Media 
Coverage of Fukushima in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. 
Political Communication. 2016;33:351. 
[31] Park DJ, Wang W, Pinto J. Beyond Disaster and Risk: Post-Fukushima Nuclear 
News in U.S. and German Press. Communication, Culture & Critique. 2016;9:417. 
[32] Scheer D, Wassermann S, Konrad W. The good, the bad, and the ambivalent: 
A qualitative study of public perceptions towards energy technologies and 
portfolios in Germany. Energy Policy. 2017;100:89-100. 
[33] Wiliarty SE. Nuclear Power in Germany and France. Polity. 2013;45:281. 
[34] Poortinga W, Aoyagi M, Pidgeon NF. Public perceptions of climate change and 
energy futures before and after the Fukushima accident: A comparison between 
Britain and Japan. Energy Policy. 2013;62:1204-11. 
[35] Goldthau A, Sovacool BK. The uniqueness of the energy security, justice, and 
governance problem. Energy Policy. 2012;41:232-40. 
[36] Reames T. Targeting energy justice: Exploring spatial, racial/ethnic and 
socioeconomic disparities in urban residential heating energy efficiency. Energy 
Policy. 2016;97:549-58. 
[37] Heffron RJ, McCauley D, Sovacool BK. Resolving society's energy trilemma 
through the Energy Justice Metric. Energy Policy. 2015;87:168-76. 
[38] Hernandez D. Sacrifice Along the Energy Continuum: A Call for Energy Justice. 
Environ Justice. 2015;8:151-6. 
[39] Sidortsov R, Sovacool B. Left out in the cold: energy justice and Arctic energy 
research. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences. 2015;5:302-7. 
[40] Sovacool B. Fuel poverty, affordability, and energy justice in England: Policy 
insights from the Warm Front Program. Energy. 2015;93:361-71. 
 27 
[41] McCauley D. Global Energy Justice: Tackling Systems of Inequality in Energy 
Production and Consumption. In: McCauley D, editor. Energy Justice: Springer; 
2018. p. 1-26. 
[42] Finley-Brook M, Holloman E. Empowering Energy Justice. International 
Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2016;13. 
[43] Heffron RJ, McCauley D. The concept of energy justice across the disciplines. 
Energy Policy. 2017;105:658-67. 
[44] Bulmer S. Politics in Time meets the politics of time: historical 
institutionalism and the EU timescape. Journal of European Public Policy. 
2009;16:307-24. 
[45] Ma S. Political science at the edge of chaos? The paradigmatic implications of 
historical institutionalism. International Political Science Review. 2007;28:57-78. 
[46] Rixen T, Viola LA, Zürn M. Historical institutionalism and international 
relations : explaining institutional development in world politics. [Electronic 
book]: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016. 
First edition.; 2016. 
[47] Hay C, Wincott D. Structure, agency and historical institutionalism. Political 
Studies. 1998;46:951-7. 
[48] Thelen K. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. Annual Review 
of Political Science. 1999;2:369-404. 
[49] McCauley D. Sustainability, Governance and Time: Exploring ‘Critical 
Junctures’ in the Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in France. 
Environmental Policy and Governance. 2013;23:283-96. 
 28 
[50] McCauley D. Sustainable Development in Energy Policy: A Governance 
Assessment of Environmental Stakeholder Inclusion in Waste-to-Energy. 
Sustainable Development. 2015;23:273-84. 
[51] Pollitt C. Time, Policy and Management: Governing the Past. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; 2008. 
[52] Jenkins K, McCauley D, Foreman A. Energy Justice: A Policy Approach. Energy 
Policy. 2017:1-5. 
[53] Pierson P. The path to European Integration: a historical-institutionalist 
analysis. In: Sandholtz W, Stone Sweet A, editors. European Integration and 
Supranational Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1998. p. 27-58. 
[54] Pierson P. Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2004. 
[55] Donnelly P, Hogan J. Understanding policy change using a critical junctures 
theory in comparative context. Policy Studies Journal. 2012;40:324-50. 
[56] Capoccia G, Keleman D. The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative and 
counterfactuals in historical institutionalism. World Politics. 2007;59:341-69. 
[57] Bell S. Do We Really Need a New ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’ to Explain 
Institutional Change? British Journal of Political Science. 2011;41:883-906. 
[58] Hall P, Taylor R. The potential of historical institutionalism: a response to Hay 
and Wincott. Political Studies. 1998;46:958-62. 
[59] Hall PA, Thelen K. Institutional change in varieties of capitalism. Socio-
Economic Review. 2008;7:7-34. 
[60] Kingdon J. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. New York: Longman; 
1995. 
 29 
[61] Kriesi H. Political Context and Opportunity. In: Snow D, Soule S, Kriesi H, 
editors. The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Oxford: Blackwell; 2004. 
[62] Schlor H, Fischer W, Hake J. Sustainable development, justice and the 
Atkinson index: Measuring the distributional effects of the German energy 
transition. Applied Energy. 2013;112:1493-9. 
[63] Renn O, Marshall JP. Coal, nuclear and renewable energy policies in Germany: 
From the 1950s to the “Energiewende”. Energy Policy. 2016;99:224-32. 
[64] IEA. Technology Roadmaps - Nuclear Energy 2015. Paris: OECD; 2017. 
[65] IEA. Statistics on Global Electricity Information. Paris2016. 
[66] Eser P, Singh A, Chokani N, Abhari RS. Effect of increased renewables 
generation on operation of thermal power plants. Applied energy. 2016;164:723-
32. 
[67] Luzzi L, Cognini L, Pizzocri D, Barani T, Pastore G, Schubert A, et al. Helium 
diffusivity in oxide nuclear fuel: Critical data analysis and new correlations. 
Nuclear Engineering and Design. 2018;330:265-71. 
[68] Volkanovski A, Ballesteros Avila A, Peinador Veira M, Kančev D, Maqua M, 
Stephan J-L. Analysis of loss of offsite power events reported in nuclear power 
plants. Nuclear Engineering and Design. 2016;307:234-48. 
[69] Pattupara RM, Pattupara R, Kannan R. Alternative low-carbon electricity 
pathways in Switzerland and it's neighbouring countries under a nuclear phase-
out scenario. Applied energy. 2016;172:152-68. 
[70] Zehavi A. A Reform Less Ordinary? Historical Institutionalism, Punctuated 
Equilibrium, and Mental Health Care Privatization. Administration & Society. 
2012;44:731-53. 
 30 
[71] Spohr F. Explaining Path Dependency and Deviation by Combining Multiple 
Streams Framework and Historical Institutionalism: A Comparative Analysis of 
German and Swedish Labor Market Policies. Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis. 2016;18:257-72. 
[72] Broschek J. Historical Institutionalism and the Varieties of Federalism in 
Germany and Canada. Publius: The Journal of Federalism. 2011;42:662-87. 
[73] McLean C, Gray T. Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Historical Institutionalism, 
and British and German perceptions of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy. Marine 
Policy. 2009;33:458-65. 
[74] Kunda-Wamuwi CF, Babalola FD, Chirwa PW. Investigating factors 
responsible for farmers' abandonment of Jatropha curcas L. as bioenergy crop 
under smallholder out-grower schemes in Chibombo District, Zambia. Energy 
Policy. 2017;110:62-8. 
[75] Salazar DJ, Moulds LA. Toward an integrated politics of social justice and 
environment: African American leaders in Seattle. Society and Natural Resources. 
1996;9:617-31. 
[76] Lauer M. Oral Traditions or Situated Practices? Understanding How 
Indigenous Communities Respond to Environmental Disasters. Human 
Organization. 2012;71:176-87. 
[77] Sheftel A, Zembrzycki S. Oral history off the record: toward an ethnography 
of practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2013. 
[78] Corner A, Venables D, Spence A, Poortinga W, Demski C, Pidgeon N. Nuclear 
power, climate change and energy security: Exploring British public attitudes. 
Energy Policy. 2011;39:4823-33. 
 31 
[79] Pidgeon NF, Lorenzoni I, Poortinga W. Climate change or nuclear power—No 
thanks! A quantitative study of public perceptions and risk framing in Britain. 
Global Environmental Change. 2008;18:69-85. 
[80] Katzenstein P. Policy and Politics in West Germany. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press; 1987. 
[81] Huß C. Energy Transition by Conviction or by Surprise? Environmental Policy 
from 2009 to 2013. German Politics. 2014;23:430-45. 
[82] EC. Deutschlands Energiewende – Ein Gemeinschaftswerk für die Zukunft. 
Berlin: German Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Provision; 2011. 
[83] Wassermann S, Reeg M, Nienhaus K. Current challenges of Germany’s energy 
transition project and competing strategies of challengers and incumbents: The 
case of direct marketing of electricity from renewable energy sources. Energy 
Policy. 2015;76:66-75. 
[84] Kersten J, Uekoetter F, Vogt M. Europe after Fukushima: German perspectives 
on the future of nuclear power. In: Mauch C, Ritson K, Trischler H, editors. RCC 
Perspectives. Munich: Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society; 2012. 
[85] Heffron RJ, Ashley SF, Nuttall WJ. The global nuclear liability regime post 
Fukushima Daiichi. Progress in Nuclear Energy. 2016;90:1-10. 
[86] McCauley D. Interest Groups in Comparative Perspective. In: Elgie R, 
Grossman E, Mazur A, editors. The Oxford Handbook of French Politics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; 2016. 
[87] Evrard A. Political Parties and Policy Change: Explaining the Impact of French 
and German Greens on Energy Policy. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. 
2012;14:275. 
 32 
[88] Sovacool B. The costs of failure: A preliminary assessment of major energy 
accidents, 1907-2007. Energy Policy. 2008;36:1802-20. 
[89] Visschers VH, Siegrist M. How a nuclear power plant accident influences 
acceptance of nuclear power: results of a longitudinal study before and after the 
Fukushima disaster. Risk Anal. 2013;33:333-47. 
[90] Capoccia G, Kelemen R. The study of critical junctures - Theory, narrative, and 
counterfactuals in historical institutionalism. World Politics. 2007;59:341-+. 
[91] McCauley D. Bottom-Up Europeanization Exposed: Social Movement Theory 
and Non-state Actors in France. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 
2011;49:1019-42. 
[92] Hall CM. Policy learning and policy failure in sustainable tourism governance: 
from first- and second-order to third-order change? Journal of Sustainable 
Tourism. 2011;19:649-71. 
[93] Johnston A, Heffron RJ, McCauley D. Rethinking the scope and necessity of 
energy subsidies in the United Kingdom. Energy Research & Social Science. 
2014;3:1-4. 
[94] McCauley D. Environmental Mobilization and Resource-Opportunity Usage: 
The Examples of WWF-France, FNE and LPO in Policy Processes. French Politics. 
2007;5:333-53. 
[95] Blom-Hansen J. A 'new institutional' perspective on policy networks. Public 
Administration. 1997;75:669-93. 
[96] Bell D, Rowe F. Are climate policies fairly made? . Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation: JRF; 2012. 
 
